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THE RIGHT OF WAY
(Abstract of an address against paternalism in government delivered by Leon 0. Prince at thd commencement of the Dickinson
School of Law, June 5th 1906.)
* * No one at all acquainted with the history of this
Republic can fail to note the obvious extension in the scope of government which has marked the present age, and the gradual elimination of boundaries between hitherto distinct but co-ordinate
The Federal executive trespasses on the legislative
branches.
sphere of Congress and usurps judicial powers. The national government invades the domain of the states, and all governments,
Federal, State and TMunicipal, exhibit an unmistakable tendency
to hedge the opportunities of private individuals and to limit the
field of associate undertaking.
The wise adjustment of cen'tripetal and centrifugal forces, ordained in imitation of nature's perfect pattern, is threatened with
The revolving spheres are veering inward from
derangement.
their orbits toward the great central sun into whose fathomless
immensities they seem to be fast falling. Should the attraction
of gravity prevail to wreck the farces of resistance -the impact of
the falling planets will kindle a conflagration, imposing, brilliant,
magnificent to behold-but its sudden splendor will presage the
annihilation of the last elements of order and durability.
*

*
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The centralizing and meddling tendencies to which I allude
are to some extent the legacy of the Civil war and the period of
abnormal Federal expansion immediately following, when the
powers of the national government were strained beyond resiliency; when military jurisdiction smashed the safeguards of the
Constitution and relegated home rule to the limbo of the obsolete;
when one man exercised despotic power unparalleled by any ruler
of the EngliAi-speaking race for two hundred years. No government of republican type can persistently violate the limitations of
self-imposed law without serious and permanent reaction.
The annexation of alien and inferior peoples disqualified for
civic responsibilities involves definite commitment to imperialistic
policies.
Steam and electricity, the multiplication of railroads and the
common employment of telegraphic and telephonic communication have emphasized the political tendency to centripetal preponderance by eliminating physical barriers and distances.
Industrial expansion has given rise in double fashion to centralizing processes. Consolidated capital has made alliance with
the government and high protective tariff laws attest the mutual
profit of their union. On the other hand, the legion foes of capital.
jealous of corporate wealth's continuous aggrandizement and dazzled by the prestige vast of one universal authority which shall be
the fount and focus of all activities, clamor for restrictive laws t-)
curb industrial enterprise and teach dependence on the state.
A few years ago the New York Democrats demanded Federal
confiscation of the coal mines, and now the President of the United
States advocates Federal regulation of life insurance and the con
fiscation of private income under the thin disguise of a progressive
inheritance tax. The indiscriminate abuse of wealth by blatherskite reformers has bred hatred in the hearts of thousands which
finds its natural vent in clamorous demand for Federal intervention and control.
The shifty demogogue, who welcomes any pretext on which to
make his base appeal to ignorance and greed, adds his note of discord to the chorus of the mob;* while the peanut politician, with
an eye single to his own advantage, hails with unconcealed delight
the establishment of bureaus and commissions which mean increased opportunities for financial graft through the open door of
public office.
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The appetite for interference grows with what it feeds upon.
We are entirely too much governed. The end and aim of at least
one half the legislation enacted at the present day is the establishment of soft snaps and easy berths for the politically inclined "sons
of rest"-and we breed a race of statesmen who understand their
business.
But there is another and deeper explanation of the growing
trend toward governmental paternalism; an explanation which
strikes its roots deep in the soil of the past. and summons to its
quick defence both sentiment and patriotism. It is found in the
utilitarian theory of "the greatest good to the greatest number,"
which is the outgrowth of the doctrine of human equality borrowed
from the revolutionary prophets of France and incorporated in
the Declaration of Independence.
I have no desire to flout in frivolous jest or slander this ancient
relic of a cherished age which recalls to grateful memory the sacrifice and valor of our fathers. It is impossible to read its familiar
phrases or to scan its immortal signatures without an answering
thrill of sympathy across the sweep of years. But the Declaration
of Independence has acquired with the lapse of time a factitious
importance which far transcends its original and historic purpose
as a campaign document designed to fire the national heart and to
shape the policy of a critical and heroic time.
"All men are created equal," is the broad assertion of its opening sentence,and in the constant iteration from stump and rostrum
and through the press of this and corollary falsehoods great truths
vital to all human progress have been obscured and Democracy
itself perverted.
fn the mouth of the ranting demagogue, or -the brain of the
ignoramus the catch words of this celebrated charter become pregnant with potentialities of mischief and crime. Clothed in the
flamboyant rhetoric of the agitator and hurled in frenzied appeal
at incarnate discontent the dogma of equality breeds anarchy and

Foremost among the advocates of paternalism stand the Socialists whose aim is to bring about, through the instrumentality of
government, a general leveling of human society by abolishing free
competition, confiscating private property in land and capital, and
having the state apportion all employment, fix wages and prescribe
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hours of labor-that is, by destroying both the opportunity and the
incentive to engage in those forms of industrial enterprise which
under natural conditions would result in inequality of dividend.
Socialism is the apotheosis of government and the annihilation of
individualism.
The significance of the Socialist movement lies not so much in
the phenomenal growth within the last fifteen years of the Social
Democratic and Socialist Labor parties. as in the general trend of
popular thought, away from the individualistic principle in tht
direction of centralization and paternalism.
The labor unions though denying identity of purpose with the
aim. and tenets of Socialism are nevertheless definitely committed
to a Socialistic creed. The Democratic party has for ten years been
steadily drifting in the same direction, while the rank and file of
Republicans are more or less enamored -of socialistic remedies for
existing evils in the state.
A blind persistent faith in the efficacy of legislation as a soyreign balm for all the ills society is heir to is the unfailing mental
trait of the Socialist and all his kindred; the false and mischievous
delusion that government possesses some 'subtle, inherent power to
reverse iat will the laws of political economy and to revolutionize
human nature by legislative fiat.
The only equality at all recognizable is equality before the law
-the right and liberty of every man to compete for 'the prizes of
life without discrimination other than that imposed by differences
of aptitude or of advantage honestly acquired. But since the unit;
of society are not endowed in equal measure with intellect and
talent, the fleeting chance that enables one man to ride in triumph
to success on fortunes rapid wing, another, with less imagination
and slower to respond, neglects or fails to comprehend and spends
his mediocre days in envious complaint. Thus equality of legal
opportunity necessarily means inequality of result.
And if the doctrine of equality is false then its utilitarian
corollary, "the greatest good of the greatest number," is also without foundation. For if men are not equal there is no sginificance in
majorities and mere numerical preponderence in point of benefit
or injury constitutes no fit criterion to gauge the equities of conflicting interests.
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Nor is it true, as howling demagogues and self-styled "champions of the oppressed" maliciously assert, that the rich are growing richer by plundering the poor while poverty gathers increasing
millions within its radius of gloom. The rich are growing richer
but not by feudal spoliation of the poor, for the poor are also growing richer. If never before was capital so busy and productive as
at present never was labor so widely employed or so well remunerated. The tendency of wages is up, not down. American workingmen today enjoy material comforts and -intellectual advantages unknown to members of their class a generation ago and still impossible in other lands. Never was wealth so sensible of its duties, so
responsive to the voice of conscience as it is today. It builds hospitals and asylums and endows schools and colleges on unprecedented scale. Wherever worthy cause struggles in heroic service
or human suffering flies -the signal of distress, there is American
wealth, open-handed, generous-hearted, to succor and relieve.
Again, the promised remedies of state control would of course
have to be administered by means of goyernment, since government
is the only agent through which society can act. But the functioni
of a socialistic government are so varied and complex that their
adequate performance would require a degree of wisdom and a
sense of justice infallible and absolute, while their incompetent performance would entail unspeakable oppression. Now government
is representative; it reflects the intellectual and moral average of
the people. But the average man is neither intellectually nor morally a model of maximum development. It is therefore somewhat
difficult to understand by what subtle alchemy you can transmute
the baser metal of humanity into the pure gold of virtue and intelligence by electing men to Congress, or by what miracle of
mathematics you can multiply one individual of ordinary calibre by
five hundred others of similar type and get anything more than
the doubtful wisdom of five hundred average men as the result of
their collective cogitations. And finally, when that sublime regard
for the rights and happiness of others which Socialism presupposes
would even now inspire the action of the mass becomes in fact the
accepted rule "of human conduct the -inequities of which we now
complain will have ceased to exist, remedial legislation will be
superfluous, and government itself will dissolve under the mild
and universal stress of milennial rejoicing.
I do not say there are no evils in the industrial world today.
But I do say that they are in every case either the incidental ac-
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companiment of new and unacclimated forms -of organization, or
else they are the result of deliberate and malicious breach of fundamental law by industrial buccaneers who basely stifle competition and then elude the vigilance of justice by taking guilty refuge
behind the corporations whose business they conduct.
The first are beyond the power of any government to arrest
because they are for the time being inseparable features of a general economic change as resistless as the flow of the tides. Their
force, however, will soon be spent. In the meantime government
can interfere with the affairs of the business world only at the certain risk of making matters worse by substituting aggravations of
tenfold greater magnitude.
As for evils of the second class, that have their source in corporate derelictions, they have long been recognized as criminal by
statutory law. The fact that government with its tedious record
of neglect now asks additional power to apprehend disturbers of
industrial peace should inspire neither respect for its competency
nor confidence in the sincerity of its purposes.
The patent ills of which we customarily complain will find
their surest remedy not through arbitrary limitation of profits
legitimately earned, nor yet in headlong rush -to centralization with
its train of destructive consequences; not in abrogation of basic
principles of liberty which all along have guaranteed to intellect
and character unfailing right of way; but in the steady growth o
an enlightened and responsive public conscience which will hold
individuals leagued in corporate power to the full measure of accountability that prevails in private life, and in a natural evolutionary adjustment induced by the ceaseless play of inherent forces.
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MOOT COURT.
COMMONWEALTH

vs. DONALD ET AL.

Gambling-When an Indictable Offense-Playing Pool when Loser Pays for
Use of Table Not Indictable Under Sec. 56, Act of March 31, 1860.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Defendant had been playing pool in a public place, viz., a tobacco store,
under the agreement that the loser of each game should pay for the same,
the owner of the table charging five cents per cue. This indictment is under the statute making gambling transactions misdemeanors. A motion has
been made to quash.
Mahon for the Commonwealth.
P. & L. col. 2203.
Gaming contracts are void. Act April 22, 1794;
It Is gaming to play on a billiard or pool table where the loser pays the
Com. v Gourdier, 80
price of the game. Ward v. State, 17 Ohio 32;
Mass. 290.
Smith, T. S., for the defendant.
Playing pool under an agreement by which the loser is to pay for the
games does not constitute gambling. State v. Hall, 32 N. J. 158; Am. &
Eng. Enc. of Law, Vol. 8, p. 1044; People v. Sergent, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 139.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
RODRIGUEZ, 3.:-The question before us has been the subject of wide
differences of judicial opinion, but of course it all depends on the differences
that may exist in the statutes of the different states on tbe subject. The
statute in Pennsylvania reads: "If any person shall keep or exhibit etc. * *
or it any person shall engage in gambling for a livelihood, or shall be without any fixed residence, and in the habit, and practice of gambling, he shal
be deemed and taken to be a common gambler, and upon conviction shall
be sentenced, etc." It will be observed that the statute requires one of
two circumstances so as to render a person punishable, viz., that the
accused shall engage in gambling for a livelihood, or be without any fixed
residence, and in the habit and practice of gambling. The Indictment in
the present case charges the defendants with playing pool in a public
place under the agreement that the loser of each game should pay for the
use of the table, but does not charge them with any of the elements necessary to constitute them common gamblers, which is what constitutes the
crime in Pennsylvania.
The counsel, both for the defendants and the commonwealth, in our
opinion, have diregarded this decisive question in the present case and
have limited themselves to the arguing of whether the fact that the money
was paid to the owner of the table and not to the winner still constituted
the defendants, gamblers or not. Both counsel have cited various decisions. pro and con. These are mostly of other states, and, as already
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said, the differences of opinion that they present, are due to the differences in the statutes. So that we must limit ourselves to the meaning and
object of the statute of this state. The counsel for defendants has, however, cited a case in Pennsylvania which conforms to the view here taken,
and that is Commonwealth vs. Phillipi, 6 Pa. Dist. 426. There' the judge
said. "It is proper for the court to say, that if a man only plays one or
two, or a very few games of poker, the jury would not be justified in saying
that he was engaging in the business for a livelihood. *** That is not the
object of the law. The object of the law is to punish men who follow
gambling as a business; not as a sole business, but as one of the businesses, they engage in to make money and earn a livelihood." The above
view is in our opinion sufficient to sustain the motion to quash, but since
both counsel have argued on the other proposition we deem it well to
express our views in regard to the matter.
In Commonwealth v. Phillips, supra, the judge says: "In general, the
words 'gaming' and 'gambling,' in the statutes, are similar in meaning,
and either one comprehends the idea that by a bet, by chance, by some
exercise of skill,or by the transpiring of some event unknown until it
occurs, something of value is as the conclusion, by terms agreed, to be
transferred from the loser to the winner; without which latter element
there is no gaming or gambling." Let us then assume that the case before
us fulfils the requirements of the statute in regard to the frequency and
number of acts, and with the definition of "gaming" and "gambling" as
given in Commonwealth vs. Phillipi, supra, let us then proceed to ascertaiu
whether the facts in this case justify us In coming to the conclusion that
the defudants engaged in gambling. Something of value must pass from
the loser to the winner, without which element there is no gaming or
gambling. Did anything of value pass from the loser to the winner in
the case before us? The loser, it is true, parted with something of value,
namely five cents, but to whom did these five cents go? They did not go to
the winner but to the owner of the table. The transaction, therefore,
lacked the essential element. It is argued by the Commonwealth however.
that such transaction was in effect the same as If the amount lost and won
had been paid by B, the loser, to A. the winner, instead of tle owner,
and the owner had then received it from A. Now If A and B play under
an agreement -that the loser shall pay for the use of the table, we areat a loss to see how the conclusion of the learned counsel for the commo.wealth can be reached. If B, being the loser, pays to C, for the use of the
table, It can not be said that it Is in effect the same as If B would pay to
A, and then A pay to C, for the use of the table, for if so, our hypothetical
case In which we have supposed B. the loser, as paying to C, ceases to be
the same.
But let us admit that such would be the effect. We come then to another question. Does this constitute a gain within the meaning of the
statute? Could the winner make a livelihood with such gains? We prnsume to say he would starve if he were to depend on these gains to
make a living. In our opinion the statute undertakes to punish such gamnbling transactions as unite in themselves the elements mentioned and the
element of profit; and such is the view taken in Commonwealth vs. Phllipt, supra. The winner in the case under consideration did not obtain any
profit by such transaction. The money went to the owner of the table and
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not to the winner. If he were to engage for a considerable period of his
life in such transactions as this and supposing that in all of them he should
be the successful player, at the end of his career the only thing we can
see he would have attained would be fame. for his skill; and we think
the law does not undertake to punish a man merely for having skill in games
and another for not having it, as long as there is not the presence of gains
which would attract and swerve him from complying with the duties which
rest upon all citizens.
Having found that the crime charged is not indictable, it is our duty to
sustain the motion to quash.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
The indictment alleges that l5onald played a game of pool, the agreement between him and his fellow-player being that the loser should pay
the owner of the table the charge for the use of it.
The common law of Pennsylvania does not criminalize gambling and
it is not contended that any non-statutory crime was committed by the
defendant. The only statute he has violated, if any, is the 56th section
of the act of March 31st, 1860; I Stewart, Purdon, 961. "If any person
shall engage in gambling for a livelihood or shall be without any fixed residence and in the habit or practice of gambling, he shall be deemed or
taken to be a common gambler" and punished.
It is not charged that Donald engaged in gambling for a livelihood, or
that he was without a fixed residence, or that he was in the habit of gambling. The offence defined in the act is therefore not laid in the indictment. For this reason, it was properly quashed by the learned court below.
We cannot agree with the learned court of quarter sessions when t
says that the act charged in the indictment, is not an act of gambling. It
is a game for stakes. The stakes may bi money, or peanuts, cigars or
beer, or anything of pecuniary value, to be paid for by the loser, and thus
procured from some third person. Com. vs. Taylor, 80 Mass. 26; Com. vs.
Gourdier, 80 Mass. 390; State vs. Maurer, 7 Iowa, 406; Brown vs. State,
49 N. J. L. 61; McDaniel vs. Commonwealth, 69 Ky. 326; As Shaw, C. J.,
said, "A game of hazard to determine who shall pay for the beer or othpr
liquor to be drunk, is strictly playing for money; it is to determine which
party shall pay a sum of money for the other." Com. vs. Taylor, supra.
By jointly engaging the table, the players became liable to the proprietor. Each of them became bound to pay him money. Their agreement put
this duty on the loser, who, in paying the money, would discharge a debt
which the other would have been under. The opportunity of using the
table, balls, cues, and room, a thing of value, Is to be bought by the loser
for the winner. It has properly been held that when ten-pin players State
vs. Records, 4 Her. 554, (Del.): Mount vs. State, 7 Ind. 654; or billiard
players, State vs. Book, 41 Iowa 550; People vs. Harrison, 28 How. Prac.
247; People vs. Cutler, 28 Hun. 465: :Ward vs. State, 17 Ohio St. 32;
Vanwey vs. State, 41 Texas 639; State vs. Leighton, 23 N. H. 167, agree
that the loser shall pay for the use of the alley or the table, they bet.
The contrary view in Blewitt vs. State, 34 Miss. 606, Breninger vs. Belvidere, 44 N. J. L. 350, we cannot adopt.
Order affirmed.
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TRIMBLE vs WIMBLE.

Contract of Sale of Farm-Destruction of Barn Before

Delivery

of Deed

and Possession-Negligence.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Trimble contracted in writing to convey Aprl 1st, 1905, a farm to
Wimble.
The farm had on it a barn, dwelling, and sundry smaller buildings.
Possession was not to be given until payment of the purchase money
In full, and delivery of the deed.
Two days before April 1st, Trimble accidentally fell in his barn while
carrying a coal-oil lamp.
The lamp exploded, and the contents of the barn and the barn itself,
were burned down.
Wimble refused then to accept the deed and pay the contract price.
Assumpsit for the price.
Showalter for the plaintiff.
Since the purchaser is in equity the Qwner, he must bear all losses,
whether at law or in equity. Insurance Co. vs. Updegraff, 21 Pa. 513.
Parcell vs. Geosser, 109 Pa. 617.
When a vendor remains in possession under an agreement and covenants to deliver the premises in as good condition as when the sale took
place and loss occurs, he is liable whether he has been guilty of misconduct, or not. Am. and Eng. Enc. Vol. 291, p. 714.
Braddock for the defendant.
Vendee entitled to have agreement carried out with pro tants deduction by reason of the loss. Story, Equity Jurisprudence, p. 779.
Real or personal property is at risk of vendor so long as he retains
title. Thompson vs. Gould, 20 Pick. 139.
OPINION OF THE COUR1.
BARNER, J.:-It appears from the statement of facts that there was
an executory contract for the sale of a farm, and that by a fire before the
time set for the payment of the purchase money and the receiving of the
deed, a great loss was incurred, whereupon the vendee refuses to accept
the deed and to pay the purchase price as he had contracted to do, alleging
that the loss was caused by the negligence of the vendor.
The loss, as indicated, was indirectly caused by the vendor's carrying
about in his barn at night a coal-oil lamp, and the whole question In the
case turns on this point. If this act on the part of the vendor was such
gross negligence as would warrant a jury in finding that it was the direct
cause of the loss, then the judgment should be for the plaintiff.
In Reed vs. Lukens, 44 Pa. 200, it is said that where a contract for the
sale of real estate has been duly executed, the vendee becomes th:
equitable owner thereof, has an insurable interest, and is liable for all losses occurring, and in case there is insurance which is eventually paid to the
vendor, that the vendor is the trustee for the purchaser, of this fund and
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must account to him for it, even though not assigned. That the purchaser
holds the land in trust, and the fund arising from any loss, 'where insured,
is to be treated as in trust as was the land. Consequently had this barn
been insured, and that policy not made void by the transfer of interest,
etc., the fund arising therefrom would have been payable to the plaintiff, who
in. turn would have been obliged to account for the same in equity to the defendant.
The plaintiff was therefore in the position of a trustee, and it was incumbent upon him to exercise at least ordinary care towards the property
which he held in trust. It is scarcely possible that a jury would say that the
carrying of a lighted coal oil lamp in a barn at night was the act of a sane
man or of a man of ordinary care and prudence.
Ordinarily a trustee
must use such diligence in his relations to his cestui que trust as a man
of ordinary prudence would practice in the case of his own estate; Witmer's Appeal, 87 Pa. 120; Neff's Appeal, 57 Pa. 91.
We are of the opinion that in a state such as we now live in, where
a statute provides that where a person carries into the open woods any
lighted candle, etc., "without having the same secured in a lantern or other
closed vessel," (Act June 1, 1887), and a fire is caused thereby he shall be
subject to a fine, that it would be perfectly reasonable to argue that where
one carries an oil lamp into a barn, which act causes the destruction of
the barn, that such act would prevent the person guilty of such negligence
from being benefitted thereby to the detriment of another.
Judgment is therefore ordered to be entered for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Trimble contracted to convey the farm on April 1st, 1905, and the deed
and possession were both to be delivered. With the making of the contract, Wimble became the equitable owner. Had the premises increased
in value, he would enjoy the increment. Decreasing in value, he would
have to receive them, in the state in which they should be at the time of
delivery. Nor would he be entitled to an abatement from the purchase
money, on account of any diminution of value. Reed v. Lukens, 44 Pa.
200: Mergan v. Scott, 26 Pa. 51; Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 117 Pa. 460, Elllo:t
v. Ins. Co., 117 Pa. 548. "A vendee," says Sugden, Vendors, "being the equitable owner of the estate from the time of the contract of sale, must pay
the consideration for it although the estate itself be destroyed between the
agreement and the conveyance; and, on the other hand, he will be entitled
to any benefit which may accrue to the estate In the interim." "When the
contract has been completely -made" says Fry, Specific Performance, T.
420: "the thing sold is at the risk of the purchaser who must bear all subsequent losses and is entitled to all subsequent gains. Subsequent events
therefore can neither determine the contract nor give either party a right
to resist its performance." Such is the doctrine of the courts of Indiana,
Thompson v. Norton, 14 Ind. 187; of those of Kentucky, Marks v. Techenor,
85 Ky. 526; Martin v. Carver's Adm. 1 S. W. 199; Johnston v. Jones, 51 Ky.
326: of those of Tennessee, Barker v. Smith, 35 Tenn. 289. The courts of
Maine, Gould v. Murch, 70 Me. 288 and of Massachusetts, Wells v. Calman,
107 Mass. 514, Thompson v. Gould, 20 Pick .134, however, apparently under-
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standing the contract to be to convey the premises in the state in which
they are, at the making of the contract, regard the contract as conditional,
and exonerate the vendee from the duty of accepting a conveyance, and
paying for it any part of the purchase money, if between the making of the
contract and the tender of the conveyancee, the buildings have been even
without the vendor's fault, destroyed by fire.
If indeed the parties have agreed -that the premises shall be conveyed
in the condition in which they were, at the making of tne contract and they
are not in that condition when the conveyance is tendered, no court it is
likely, would hold the vendee bound to accept the conveyance, and to pay
for it the cofitr~ct price, or a price proportionately reduced.
In the ordinary case, this qualification, that the premises are to remain
in their present condition cannot be implied. But can it not be implied that
the vendee conditioned his promise to receive the conveyance and pay for
it, upon the non-occurrence of a reduction of value by the purposed dr negligent act of the vendor? In Gibson v. Eller, 13 Ind. 124, a fire occurring
by the negligence of the vendor, the vendee was allowed to abate the price.
Although the contract expressly called for the conveyance of the land In
its condition at the time of the making of the contract, it is said that, had
it not done so the vendor would nevertheless be subjected to diminution
of the price, if his negligence had caused the fire.
It could not be supposed that when a vendee agreed to buy land, he
intended the vendor to understand that he would accept it, and pay for
it, despite purposed or even negligent destruction of the buildings before
the conveyance. Abstinence from wilful or negligent injury to the property
must be deemed a tacit condition of the obligation of the vendee to accept
and pay for the conveyance.
The present action is for the price of the land. The defendant is unwilling to receive the deed, and to pay any portion of the price. We think
that, if the destruction of the barn was caused by the negligent act of
Trimble, he has disentitled himself to recover.
The learned court below correctly remarks that If the act of carrying
the coal oll lamp into the barn "was such gross negligence as would warrant a jury in finding that it was the direct cause of the loss, the judgment
should be for the defendant." But the question was not submitted to the
jury. The court undertook'itself to say that Trimble's act was negligenc,
thus trenching on the province of the jury. It cannot be said, as matter
of law; that is, the court cannot say and impose its opinion on the jury,
that entering a barn with a lightel coal-oil lamp is negligent.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.
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ORR vs. GILMAN, PRICE AND ORR.

Right of Married Woman To Sue Partnership of Which Her Husband Is A
Member-Acts of 1848- 1887 and 1893 Relating To Rights
Of Married Women Construed.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
and
Orr while engaged as partners in trade gave a note
Price
Gillman,
In the sum of $500 to the plaintiff who was Orr's wife, for money she had
advanced the partnership. This action is brought after the maturity of
said note and its dishonor. It is contended that the plaintiff cannot bring
an action against a firm of which her husband is a member.
Cook for the plaintiff.
A married woman may sue a firm of which her husband is a member.
Freiler vs. Kear, 126 Pa. 470; Cited Acts of June 3, 1887 and June 8, 1893
P. & L. p. 344; Devin vs. Devin, 6 L. R. A. 507; Curry vs. Phillips, 14 Pa.
Co. Ct. 479.
Hoover for the defendant.
A married woman could not sue her husband at common law, nor Is she
given the power under the married women's acts except as therein mentioned. Kendry vs. Kendry, 131 Pa. 24; Pier vs. Siegel et ux., 107 Pa. 502.
Small vs. Small, 129 Pa. 366.
A married woman cannot sue a partnership of which her husband Is a
member, for money loaned by her to the firm. Kutz's Appeal, 40 Pa. 90.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
MEMIOLO, J.:--Gilman, Price and Orr while engaged as partners In
trade gave a note in the sum of $500, to the plaintiff who was Orr's wife,
for money she had advanced the partnership. This action is brought after
the maturity of said note and its dishonor. It is contended that the plaintiff cannot bring an action against a firm of which her husband is a member.
In this case it is conceded by counsel on both sides that the wife could
not bring an action against the firm under the common law. It Is also conceded that under our present law in Pennsylvania a partnership is not such
a legal entity that the individuality of the members composing such partnership Is lost and that the partnership stands alone. At common law, by a
legal fiction a corporation was regarded as an entity but with a partnership
It is not thus. Jacand v. French, 12 East 317; Jones v. Blum, 145 N. Y. 333.
In the states where 'the civil law obtains a partnership is considered as
a legal entity. in Louisiana a partnership is a legal entity. Liverpool etc.
Nay. Co. v. Agar, 14 Fed. Rep. 615; Aridks Succession, 22 La. Ann. 503.
Hence we must look to our statutes concerning married women and
see whether any statutes confer upon a married woman the right to sue
her husband in the court of common pleas.
Under the acts of 1848, 1851 and 1856, provisions were made giving the
wife certain rights over her separate estate as a feme sole, and to sue and
to be sued in respect thereof as a feme sole but none of these acts conferred
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on her the right to sue her husband. They were statutes passed to protect
the separate estate of the wife from the creditors of the husband. Bear'
Admrs. v. Bear, 53 Pa. 525.
In Kutz's appeal, 40 Pa. 90, a case much similar to the one at bar, Sarah
Kutz the wife of Diniel B. Kutz, loaned $500 to William Heidenreich and
Daniel Kutz, wh, were in partnership. At the time the note became due
the partnership was insolvent and an assignment to J. D. Warner had been
made for the benefit of creditors, and on distribution, Mrs. Kutz put in her
claim, and the auditor allowed it, but the court reversed the auditor and
disallowed the claim on writ of error from the Supreme Court. Strong, J.,
in an opinion, July 24. 1861, held that she could recover but that she couldn't
bring an action against the firm.
In a number of cases it has been held that the wife may recover on a
judgment confessed by the husband when he waives the right to be sued.
Rose v. Latshaw, 90 Pa 238; Williams' appeal, 47 Pa. 307.
It has been held in Daniel Freiler et al. vs. F. G. Kear et al., 126 Pa.
470, that she may bring an action against the firm of which her husband Is
a member, on a judgment confessed and no objection to the suit by her husband, and creditors may attack her action for fraud which may be proven
not to exist.
That a wife may set.up a claim against her husband in the distribution
of his estate by sheriff's sale is well established. Ann Zeigler's estate, 84
Pa. 342; Marrit v. Marrit, 4 Pa. Co. Ct. 379.
In the distribution of her father's estate where her husband is administrator. Abrahims estate, 3 Pa. Co. Ct. 379.
Section 4 of the act of June 3, 1887, known as the Married Women'b
Property Act, provides, "Husband and wife have the same civil remedies
upon contracts in their own name and right, as unmarried persons." This
section seems broad enough to empower the wife to sue, but in Lavina
Small v. David W. Small, 129 Pa. 366, wherein this act is construed, It Is
held she cannot sue and that the legislature did not Intend to empower the
wife !o sue her husband.
Under the act of 1893 this power would seem to be conferred but the
section seems to be construed the same as section 4 of the act of 1887, and
the general construction of this act is the same as the act of 1887. In Snall
v. Small, supra, it was held that such a power would not be implied from the
words of an act of the legislature; that it must be expressed by a direct
mandate of the legislature before the courts would recognize it, because of
Its being a power and right of such moment to people and it would frequently be brought to the home of many citizens. It would seem that such a
right of the wife to sue her husband would have a tendency to destroy
many properties of the marriage relation, especially confidence between the
parties, that the legislature of any state would be rather hesitant to pass
such an act. In view of the foregoing authorities we must decide in favor of
the defendants.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
It is not'necessary for us to decide whether Mrs. Orr could have sued
Gilman and Price, the partners of her husband alone; that is, whether, !f
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her relation precluded her suing him, it made possible a suit against the two
partners without joinder of him; practically rendering the contract severable. The action is not against Gilman and Price, but against them and Orr.
At common law a woman could not sue her husband. This disability
remained after the passage of the act of 1848, and of that of 1887. Kennedy
v. Knight, 174 Pa.408 ; Small v. Small, 129 Pa. 366. The third section of
the act of June 8th, 1893, 2 P. & L. 2905, after declaring that she may sue "in
all respects, and in any form of action, and with the same effect and results
and consequences as an unmarried person," adds, "but she may not sue her
husband except in proceedings for divorce, or in a proceeding to protect or
recover her separate property, whensoever he may have deserted or separated himself from her without sufficient cause, or may have neglected or
refused to support her." She could not therefore sue him for the recovery
of the money lent, inasmuch as he has not deserted her or separated himself from her; nor neglected or refused to support her. No later legislation
has Increased her power to sue her husband.
If a wife can not sue her husband alone, can she sue him jointly with
others, for, e. g., a joint tort, or on a joint contract? The answer to this
question, furnished by the decisions, is reasonably distinct. In Kutz's Appeal, 40 Pa. 90, while it is allowed to a wife to claim against the assigned
estate of the firm of which her husband is a member, it is held that the
relation between her and him had prevented suit and hence, that the
statute of limitations had not barred her right to claim, although she
made her loan to the firm in 1845 and the assignment was not made until
1857.
Though a suit could not be maintained by a wife upon a note executed
by a firm composed of the husband and another, against the firm, If a surety
was separately liable upon it, the note being joint and several, or several,
she could maintain an action against the surety; Barr v. Greenawalt, 62
Pa. 172; although, she recovering, the surety would have a right of action
against her husband and his Dartner.
The inability to sue the husband, and consequently, a firm of which he
Is a member, depends however upon his dissent. He may confess a judgment, when sued, alone, Kincade v. Cunningham, 118 Pa. 501; Rose v. Latshaw, 90 Pa. 238; or in conjunction with partners, or he may otherwise, e. g.,
by failing to appear or plead, indicate his assent to the suit. Freiler v.
Kear, 126 Pa. 470. He only can object. His partners cannot. It does not
appear that Orr has separated himself from ijis partners in the making of
their defence, and we shall assume that -hehas not. The defendants generally, are contending that the plaintiff cannot bring the action against the
firm. The husband then contesting the right of his wife to sue, the learned
court below properly held that she could not maintain the action; and
i-oprily decided the plea in abatement in favor of the defendant.
Judgment affirmed.
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IN RE PRICE'S ESTATE.

Devise and Bequest to an Unincorporated Charitable Institution-Will Not
Stipulating To What Use They Should Be Put.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Price the testator, devised to the "Carlisle Hospital" two parcels of
land lying in Pennsylvania, also the sum of ten thousand (10,000) dollars.
No stipulation or provisions appearing in the will indicated to what use
the lands or funds were to be put. The "Carlisle Hospital" consists of an
association of charitably disposed individuals, never incorporated, organized
for the free treatment of diseases afflicting humanity. Before the auditor
the question is raised as to the validity of the devise and bequest above
described.
Cook for the plaintiff.
Gifts to charitable uses will be sustained although there are no trustees
and no definite beneficiaries, provided general interest of the testator can
be ascertained. Courts of Equity will never suffer a trust to fail for want
Religious societies, whether
of a trustee. Tied on real Prop. See. 884.
incorporated or not, have capacity to take and hold charitable bequests.
Evangelical Association's Appeal, 35 Pa. 216.
Forsyth for the defendant...
A party claiming a devise to a religious or charitable use must show
that it was executed strictly in accordance with the provisions of the act
of April, 16, 1856. Hannah Hufflield's Estate, 5 Phil. 219.
Does not appear whether or not the gift was made within one month
of donor's death. If made within the month the gift must fail. P. & L.
Col. 537.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
KLEEMAN, J.:-It is clear that the devise and bequest to the Carlisle
Hospital are not void simply because nothing appears in Price's will indicating to what use the land and fund were to be put. When a gift Is made
to a charitable or religious Institution, whether incorporated or not. and
no purpose is expressed, the gift will be deemed to have been intended to
be applied to the objects for which the institution was created. The Evan.
Association Appeal, 35 Penna 316; Yard's Appeal 64 Penna. 95.
The main question in this case is whether the Carlisle Hospital, an
unincorporated charitable association, is capable of taking the bequest and
devise.
In Blenon's Estate, Brightly 339, unincorporated charitable Institutions
took legacies given to them without any direction that the gifts should be
expended for charitable purposes. Before our statute of self-incorporation,
bequests to unincorporated religious congregations, or to literary or charitable associations, were frequent, and, indeed, there have been not a few
since. In the case of the Evangelical Association's Appeal, 35 Pa. 316, it was
held that the bequest was not void, because given simply to an incorporated
association, and not upon any defined charity, or for any specified charitable use.
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It has been generally held that unincorporated societies may take bequests for charitable purposes either as beneficiaries, or directly, such bequests to be used by them in furthering their charitable objects.
It seems to be well settled, by what I conceive to be the weight of authority and in accord with reason, that an incorporated association may
take a legacy. Here there is no limitation of the gift as to its use or purpose, such as is often found in testamentary dispositions. In order to carry
out the intention of the eestator, we have only to see to it that the gift
reaches the proper officer of the association. The testator appears to have
been satisfied to give the money to the association without any direction as
to how it was to be used, relying, as he might well do, upon the general and
established character of the association.
That an unincorporated association is competent to receive a direct gift
of money, was admitted to be settled law by Sir John Leach, in Wellbeloved
v. Jones. 1 Sim. & S. 40.
Is the devise valid? The general rule is that an unincorporated - association cannot take a devise but may hold it as trustees. They may hold
land subject to charitable use. Here the devise is for a charitable use, and
the beneficiaries are the real owners. There is no question but that a charity was intended. No one will contend that any beneficial Interest was intended to -be conferred upon the individuals who constitute -the association.
The object of the gift was clearly that charitable work, which the association had in charge, and the beneficiaries are the persons whose welfare
was to be promoted by the work. A devise to the "Carlisle Hospital" for
the use of disease afflicted humanity is not to fail in the twentieth century,
because the legal title is given to an association incapable of taking it, or
forbidden by law to take it. Chancery steps in to enforce the charity, and
commits it to those who may lawfully administer it. A devise is not void
because the legal title is given to an unincorporated association but, under
the act of April 26, 1855, a trustee may be appointed to enforce the trust.
Unincorporated societies have been recognized as trustees for the administration of charities. Pickering vs. Shotwell, 10 Pa. 23.
We are clearly of opinion that the devise and bequest are valid.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The association known as the Carlisle Hospital, is a group of persons
not combined merely for a day and liable to speedy dispersion but united
in a plan which contemplates the durability of the group, by providing for
the ingress of new constituents, either for the purpose of taking the
place of those who retire, or of adding to the original number. It has pracally as much likelihood of longevity, as it would were it incorporated. Its
object is not evanescent; if it has not already acquired it may acquire
property of a permanent nature, if conveyed directly to trustees for it.
The Hospital is a charitable association. Phila. v. Elliott, 3 R 170;
Phila. v. Fox, 64 Pa. 169; Taylor v. Mitchell, 57 Pa. 209. Biddle's Appeal,
99 Pa. 525; 2 P. & L. Dig. Decisions 2764. Such associations, though unincorporated have personality attributed to them for certain purposes. They
can acquire contractual rights which they may enforce by action; Maguire'.,
Estate. 13 Phila. 244; Ryers v. Congregation of Blossburg, 33 Pa. 117;
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Phipps v. Jones, 20 Pa. 263. They can acquire proprietary rights. They may,
e. g., be legatees; Evangelical Association's Appeal, 35 Pa. 316; Blenon's
estate, Bright 339; Witman v. Lex, 17 S. & R. 88; or devisees. The devise
does not lapse, because the association is unincorporated, and because no
trustee was named, nor trust declared by the devisor. McGirr v. Aaron, 1
P. & W. 49; Magill v. Brown, Bright 346; Zeisweiss v. James, 63 Pa. 465;
Of. Cong. Shaarai Shomayim v Moss, 22 Super. 356; 22 P. & L. Dig. Decisions 39093.
It is not important that the object of the devise to the hospital was not
expressed. It may be inferred to have 'been to assist it to perform its charitable work.
Appeal dismissed.

MOONEY vs. DIME SAVINGS INSTITUTION.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
M is the administrator of one, Eliza Watkins, deceased, who had given
to her agent, John Williams, her savings bank book with a power of attorney to deposit and draw money, which power was exercised by said Williams for several years prior to the. death of decedent. After the latter's
death, but before the defendant learned of her death, the defendant made
Th's
payments to the agent, amounting in all to one thousand dollars.
action is brought by plaintiff as administrator of Eliza Watkins.
I. A power of attorney such as mentioned in the statement of facts does
not give the agent an interest in the thing itself about which the agency is
created and does not constitute a power coupled with an interest.
Hartley and Mino's appeal, 52 Pa. 212.
Yerkes Appeal, 99 Pa. 401.
Frink v. Roe, 70 Calif. 296.
Huffeut on Agency, page 88.
Coffin .. Landis, 10 Wright 426.
Blackstone v. Buttermore, 53 Pa. 266
Hunt v. Roumania, 8 Wheaton U. S. 174.
Irwin v. Workman, 3 Watts 357.
Bancroft v. Ashurst, 2 Grant 513.
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Wilson, 139 N. Y. 284.
I[.. The death of the principal revokes the authority of the agent and
any contracts made with him are a nultity though no notice of revocation
is given.
Gait v. Galoway, 4 Pet. 332.
Lewis Executor, v. Ker, 17 Iowa 73.
Bank v .Estate of Leavenworth, 28 Vermont 209.
Davis v. Monroe Savings Bank, 46 Vermont 276.
Kent's Commentaries, book 2, page 641.
Michigan Ins. Co. v Estate of Leavenworth, 30 Vermont, 11.
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Farmers Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 139 N. Y. 284.
Chambers v. Serg., 73 Ala. 372.
Weber v. Bridgman, 113 N. Y., 600.
Thad. S. Smith, attorney for the plaintiff.
In Pennsylvania the common law rule, that death revokes the agency,
instantaneously does not hold. The act of an agent done bona fide after
the death of the principal, and before notice of the death, Is binding upon
the principal. 4 W. & S. (Pa.) 282; Burney (Pa.) 305; 201 Pa. 299; 17 Mo.
234; 46 Vt. 728. The last of the above enumerated cases upholds the
common law rule but Pierpont, Chief J., acknowledges that the common law
rule has been substituted by the civil law in Pennsylvania, and cites
4 W. & S. (Pa.) 282.
Acts of the agent with third parties without notice of the revocation of
the agency are binding upon the principal. Vol. 1, p. 1220, American &
English Enc. of Law; 122 Mass. 484. *
Rule of notice substantially same as on dissolution of partnerships. 38
Conn. 187; Vol. 1, p. 1220, American & English Ency. of Law.
Where an agent of a firm authorized to draw checks against firm's
bank account for use of the firm continued to do so after the death of thq
firm, the bank being ignorant of the death, checks so drawn were held to
bind the firm. 32 N. Y. 553.
The revocation of an agency by the death of the principal should no!
be distinguished In its effects from the revocation by acts of the parties,
17 Mo. 234; 42 La. Ams. 789; 8 Ohio 52; 71 N. Y. 205; 4 W. & S. (Pa.)
282.
Where a person has an account in a bank as an attorney for an other,
the bank is bound. In the absence of intended misappropriation, to pay the
attorney's checks and hence will be protected In paying them. 201 Pa. 299;
104 U. S. 54; 194 Pa. 334; 57 Pa. 202; 137 U. S. 411; 48 Conn. 550. The
designation of the party for whom the depositor Is acting has Its uses, as
in case of an execution attachment or an attempt to appropriate the money
to the payment of an individual debt.
Samuel A. Temko, attorney for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
This is an action of assumpslt, brought by the administrator of Eliza
Watkins, against the Dime Savings Bank.
Bouvier's Dict. defines Power of Attorney: "An instrument authorizing a person to act as the agent or attorney of the person granting it. A
general power authorizes the agent to act generally in behalf of the principal. A special power is one limited to particular acts."
In this case, the agent of Eliza Watkins, John Williams, had a special
power of attorney only, to draw and deposit money for his principal, with
the defendant bank. This power was exereized for several years before the
death of the principal. Now, after the death of the principal the agent goes
to the bank and draws therefrom $1,000. For this sum the plaintiff sues
the bank,
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In Cassidy v. McKenzie, 4 W. & S. 282, a case cited by the attorney for
defendant, J. Rodgers dwells on this question quite extensively and cites:
Hazard v. Treadwell, (Str. 506); 12 Mod. 346, where the court held: "That
the credit arising from an ostensible employment continues at least with
regard to those who have been accustomed to deal on the faith of that employment until they have notice of its being at an end, or till its termination
is notorious, and these are principles founded on the most obvious justice.
Thus, if a man is the notorious agent for another to collect debts, it is but
reasonable that debtors should be protected in payments to the agent until
they are informed that the agency has terminated. Here the precise poinc
is, whether a payment to an agent when the parties are ignorant of th.
death is a good payment. Cases of this kind must often have occurred, and
it would astonish the mercantile world to be informed that the factor was
liable on a contract made in the name of his principal because he was dead,
a fact of which he was ignorant, and of which he could not by any possibility be informed. * * * * That a payment may be good today or bad tomorrow from the accidental circumstance of the death of the principal, which
he did not know, and which by no possibility could he know? It would be
unjust to the agent and unjust to the debtor."
In 201 Pa. 299, the defendants were doing a banking business, receiving
deposits subject to check. One Fertig onened an account in the bank in
the name of "F. J. Fertig, attorney for A. Baumann." He did considerable
business with the bank, for his principal, and after the death of the principal her administrator sued the bank, averring that the account as opened
showed the money to be that of Mrs. Baumann, and that the bank had no
legal right to pay it out on the checks of Fertig, the agent. The court held:
"The relation between a bank and its customer is that of debtor and creditor; a bank is an institution of a quasi-public character, and when a
bank, without legal cause, refuses to honor a check drawn upon it, by a
depositor, something more than a mere breach of contract is involved and
it is liable to the depositor for substantial damages." The lower court gave
judgment for the defendants and the Supreme court affirmed the same.
The attorney for plaintiff cites Davis v. Winsdor Savings Bank, 46
Vermont 729. In this case a Mrs. Dudley deposited sums of money In the
defendant bank, and received from the bank a deposit book. There was
no evidence tending to show that the bank had any knowledge or reason to
suppose that the money belonged to any one but herself, except the fact that
she deposited it in the name of her brother. Pierpont, 0. J.:"The question
is whether the defendant bank was justified in paying the money which it
held to the credit of the deceased, to Mrs. Dudley, his sister, who deposited the money as his agent, such payment being made after the revocation of
the agency, by the death of the principal, said bank having no knowledge of
such death, and paid the money in good faith? The weight of authority
on this question seems to be decidedly in favor of the principle that the
death of the principal Instantly terminates the power of the agent, an.I
that all dealings with the agent subsequent to that event, are void and of
no effect, even though the parties were ignorant of the fact."
We are inclined to believe, that the rule in the last cited case Is very
hard and unjust. Chief Justice Pierpont in his opinion of the above case,
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admits that the rule has been changed in Pennsylvania and cites 4 W. &
S. 282.
In the case at Bar, the defendant bank was acting in good faith, and
was absolutely unaware of the death of Eliza Watkins. It would be very
inconvenient and impracticable for a bank to ask an agent every time he
comes to do business with the same, whether his principal is living or not.
It is Impliedly understood that the principal is living, and on this principle
the bank paid out the money to the agent. We do no think the bank liable.
Judgment for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Eliza Watkins gave to Williams a power of attorney to make deposits
of her moneys, from time to time, in the Savings Institution, and to draw
moneys therefrom for her. The power was exercised repeatedly through a
serie. of years, until her death. After her death, having no knowedge of it,
the Institution has continued to allow Williams to withdraw money. Her
administrator claims all that was on deposit at her death.
An agency rests on' the assent of the principal, which except for a
consideration, the latter cannot deprive himself of the power to retract at
any time. Death of the principal leaves non-existent the person for whom
the agent is to act. All his real estate has passed to his heirs; All his personal estate to his administrator. It would be a solecism thus to hold, and
at the same time to maintain that some person, other than these, may
create duties which will burden this property, or rights which will subtract
from it. A dead man has no property; he can dispose of none. He can
not act, and therefore he cannot authorize.
The attempt is made in a few cases ,to maintain that the extinction by
death, of the agent's power, ought to be made dependent upon the knowledge
of that death, by the agent, or by the person who deals with him. Various
suggestions, in vindication of this view, have been made. We are reminded that the express revocation of an agency will not in fact revoke it,
except with respect to one who has knowledge or the means of knowing,
of the revocation. A partnership may be dissolved, and the agency of each
partner ended, but persons who have dealt with the firm through a partner,
may continue to deal with It through him, until they learn of the dissolution. A species of estoppel is alleged to preclude the denial of the continuance of the agency. We do not think it proper to predicate any similar
estoppel in the case of death. Death is involuntary. After it has occurred
the dead man is no longer capable of giving notice of it. He could not
have anticipated It, and should not be estopped for not having forewarned
others that it was about to occur. Nor can we see that the heir or administrator should be estopped. They may have had no knowledge of the ante
-mortem existence of the power of attorney. Nor could they know with
whom, out of possible millions, the agent would enter into business relations.
To make the extinction of the agency by death, depend on proof of
knowledge of the death, by the agent or the party with whom he deals,
would create an issue which in a large number of cases, it would be impracticable for the representatives of the dead principal to meet. How
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hard it would be to prove knowledge, in many cases! On the other hand,
if the principle were assumed that the burden of showing Ignorance should
be upon the agent or the party who has dealt with him, in a large proportion of cases, the representatives of the deceased would be unable to know
whether the alleged Ignorance was real or not, The dead man's estate
would be liable to spoliation by evidence which however false there would
seldom be a means of refuting.
Death is usually a conspicuous event. The agent is apt soon to learn
of it. If despite his knowledge he were able to create rights in others who
had no knowledge of it, he could wantonly disturb the estate of the dead.
The cases are comparatively rare, ('See Century Digest, Art. Principal and
Agent) in which persons have dealt with an agent in ignorance of th%4
death of his principal. Though the result of the principle that death ipso
facto repeals an agency, may be occasionally severe, it will not be frequent.
It is better that this mischief should be borne than that the greater mischiet
flowing from insistence on knowledge of the death, should be Invited.
The great preponderance of authority supports the doctrine that death
of the principal at once ends the authority of the agent; Huffcut, Agency
p. 62; Long v. Thayer, 150 U. S. 520; Ferris v. Irving, 28 Calif. 645;
Vance v. Anderson, 39 Ia. 426; Cleveland v. Williams, 29 Texas, 204. It
is assumed in Burrell v. Smith, 24 Mass. 291; Mich. I-s. Co. v. Leavenworth. 30 Vt. 11; - Farmers' & Co. v. Wilson, 139 N. Y. 284. Wharton. on
Agency, concedes that this doctrine is that of English law, although showing a preference for the Civil Law in this respect.
On the other side, are a decision of the supreme court of Pennsylvania,
two cases in Missouri, and possibly two in Ohio. In Ish v. Crane, 8 Ohio St.
520, it is admitted that death of the principal ends the agency, even when
it is not known to have occurred, if the act done by the agent is the making
of a deed or conveyance that must be made in the name of the principal, but
it is contended that acts not by deed, not needing to be done in the
name of the principal, will be valid, if there has been no knowledge of
death. This is a purely technical distinction. B, having A's authority to
sell her land, after A's death, found a buyer, and received a part of the
price, putting the buyer into possession. The question was whether B's vendee having had no knowledge of A's death acquired an equity tobe allowed
to remain in possession, as owner on completing the payment of the purchase
money. It was held that he did. But,when B made the contract, he had to
make it, he madd it. as for A. When he received a part of the money, he
received it for A. When he delivered possession, he did it as the agent of
A. When the appeal is to the hardship of denying validity to an agent's
act after the death of the principal as a reason for conceding validity ,o
it, it is puerile to distinguish between acts done under seal, and acts not
so done; between what the court is pleased to call conveyances of "title,"
and conveyances of right to possession, and to ownership.
Cassidy v. McKenzie, 4 W. & S. 282, is the principal authority vouchable
in Pennsylvania. In order to prove payment of a judgment by the defendant
B, it was proved that the plaintiff therein, A, had given him, B, an order to
pay the money for which the judgment was subsequently recovered, to C,
which stated that C's receipt should be an acquittance. This order was
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written on April 5th, 1836. A died in 1839, before June 21st. One partial
payment was made by B, under the order, to C, Sept. 29, 1838; and six others
were made, the last on Nov. 15th, 1839. The administrator plaintiff in the
sci fa. quare e xecutio von objected to proof of these post mortern payments.
Answering that the defendant had made the payments in ignorance of the
death of A, the court suggests as reason for holding that this Ignorance
validated the payment, (a) payment after express revocation not known
by the payor, would be good, but it would puzzle -the most acute man to
justify a distinction between an express revocation and a revocation by
(b) authorities recognize that when the power of the agent is
death;
coupled with an interest, the death of the principal does not revoke it; that
is, they are anxious to rid themselves of the absurdity that death revokes
the power. The rational ground would be that, though the conveyance by
an attorney after the death of his principal, would be void at law, it would
be good in eQuity.
There is a distinction between express revocation and revocation by
death. In the former, the principal remains alive, and can take steps to
signify to others the fact that he has revoked. ne remains owner of his
property, and is still a possible subject of duties to be created by the agent.
-When he dies, no duties can any longer be created for him. If made at
all, they are conferred on somebody else. If the agent's acts are to affect
property, it is not lis property, but tnat of his heir or administrator. He
is not alive to take measures to diffuse information of h s death, and the
heir or administrators may know nothing of the existence of the power, or
who the agent is. The express revocation is a phenomenon that may be
known only to the principal and agent. The death of the principal is an
event which gains early notoriety. To say nothing of the burial ceremonies, in the case before the court letters of administration had been
granted on the deceased's estate five months before three of the payments
were made. If it is a hardship for one who deals with an agent, in reliance
on his authority, to suffer loss on account of its having been without his
knowledge withdrawn from him, it it is also a hardship to those who have
succeeded to his property, to be affected by acts of an agent, of whose
Figency they have known nothing. It is surprising to hear the suggestion
that there is no solid difference between the revocableness of a power which
is coupled with an interest, and that of a power for which the agent has paid
nothing. If A has lent money to B on a pledge of a chattel with power to
sell it, it is easy to feel the propriety of saying that this power shall not
]e revoked by B's death. He has parted with value for it, and the act to
be done by A is for his own benefit, not for that of B. Surely to distinguish
bc-tween such a case and that in which the agent has no "interest" in the
retention of his power, is not to show an anxiety to rid oneself of "the
absurdity" of holding that, when there Is no "interest" the death of the
principal shall revoke the Power.
It Is not desirable that the law of Pennsylvania should separate itself
from that of England, a majority of the states of the Union, and of the United
States, when the reasons are so little cogent as -those given by Rogers, J.,
in Cassidy v. McKenzie. In that case, also, more than three years had
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elapsed since the making of the power of attorney, before the disputed
payments were made. It would be unreasonable to suppose that the parties
intended that such a power should last forever. Unless the order could be
treated as an assignment of the debt we think the defendant ought to have
suspected that the authority of Burgeon to receive the money from the
defendant had lapsed. But, the decision might be not unreasonably sustained by interpreting the order into an assignment of the debt. Of course,
an assignment would not be revoked by the death of the assignor.
In Penna. Title & Trust Co. v. Meyer et al. 201 Pa. 2999, cited by the
learned court below in its careful opinion, the question presented was not
one of revocation but of the creation of a power in A to withdraw deposits
belonging to B. They had been withdrawn, while the owner of them was
alive, and there had been no revocation of any power ever granted. The
deposit had been made in the name of "Frank J. Fertig, attorney for Anna
Baumann." It was held that Fertig had the power to check upon the deposit,
and the banker was entitled to credits for payments, as against Anna
Bauman, during whose life they were made, or her- administrator.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.

BOOK REVIEW
The American Judiciary, by Simeon P. Baldwin, L. L. D. The Century
Company, N. Y. 1905.
One of the American State Series, published under the supervision of
Prof. W. W. Willoughby, of Johns Hopkins University this book of 400
pages is exceedingly interesting and valuable. A jurist of acknowledged
ability, its author has discussed in it with competent learning and In an
excellent style, a large number of important questions pertaining to the judiciary. Among the most significant chapters are those dealing with the relation of the judges to the political departments, their function of declaring
acts of legislation unconstitutional, the organization of the courts, both state
and federal, the relation between the state and the national courts, trial
courts for civil issues; criminal procedure, the enforcement of judgments,
and the modes of appointment of judges and their compensation. We notice
that, while stating that congress, pending the McCardle case, withdrew
from the Supreme Court its appellate jurisdiction the author neglects co
say that congress acted on a suggestion from the court itself. Although he
remarks that the arrogation by courts of the power to annul legislation is
"'something which no other country in the world would tolerate," he naively
adds that "it rests on solid reason." Appaxently this country has a monopoly of this sort of "reason." The histordc allusions in the chapter on enforcing judgments are interesting. To his professional bias we presume, is to be attributed the sentiment that "The freer a country is
and the quicker it steps in the march of civilization, the more lawyers it
will naturally have," and it is to be regretted, If this be true, that the
bar is itself at present exeTting itself so vigorously to prevent accessions
to its ranks.
We have seldom examined a more readable book, or one which will
more amply repay perusal.

